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Abstract—As the distribution grid moves toward a tightly-
monitored network, it is important to automate the analysis of the
enormous amount of data produced by the sensors to increase the
operators situational awareness about the system. In this paper,
focusing on Micro-Phasor Measurement Unit (µPMU) data, we
propose a hierarchical architecture for monitoring the grid and
establish a set of analytics and sensor fusion primitives for the
detection of abnormal behavior in the control perimeter. Due to
the key role of the µPMU devices in our architecture, a source-
constrained optimal µPMU placement is also described that finds
the best location of the devices with respect to our rules. The
effectiveness of the proposed methods are tested through the
synthetic and real µPMU data.
Index Terms—Distribution Grid, Micro-Phasor Measurement
Unit (µPMU), Anomaly Detection, Optimal Placement.
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, Distribution System Operators (DSOs) have
lacked information about the real-time operation of the grid.
However, this situation is changing. Similar to the Phasor
Measurement Units (PMUs) at the transmission level, Micro-
Phasor Measurement Units (µPMUs) are designed to mea-
sure real-time voltage and current phasors in a synchronized
manner at specific locations on the distribution system. These
measurements can be utilized by the DSO, but useful trans-
lation from raw data to information is first required [2],
[3]. This information can provide a level of insight that is
not attainable by Distribution Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (DSCADA) data. Visualizing and interpreting raw
sensor streams can be overwhelming for DSOs, considering
the large quantity of data that could flow in from different
parts of the grid [4]. Therefore, it is essential to mine the
data collected with analytic tools that can derive informative
measurements and form automated reports.
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A. Literature Review
Recent work has focused on the PMU data utilization at
the transmission level to improve the Wide-Area Monitoring,
Protection, and Control [5], [6]. Distribution grids, however,
are still lagging in that respect, since tools for the transmission
grid may not be directly applicable to the distribution grid due
to a different operation environment, such as load imbalances,
untransposed lines, and the existence of single-phase and
two-phase laterals. Transmission operations and system wide
analysis are concerned with large imbalances in load and
generation, and as a result frequency, whereas distribution
operations are concerned with localized, but frequent events
such as voltage imbalance, overloading, and outage manage-
ment. The goal of this paper is to fill the distribution systems
analysis gap by defining physics-aware algorithms that process
µPMU data for the automatic detection of any grid behavior
that does not comply with the (quasi) steady-state regime of
operation, as well as the physical limits of the grid. Most of
the prior research on sensor data analytics (including SCADA
and PMU measurements) is concerned with detecting events
on the grid transmission level. For example, Pan et al., [7]
use data mining techniques on PMU measurements and audit
logs for event classification. A linear basis expansion for the
PMU data is described by Chen et al., [8], [9] for event
detection application. A similar approach, based on Principal
Component Analysis (PCA), is used in [10], [11] for event
detection and data archival. Allen et al., [12] describe the use
of voltage phasor angle differences between different PMU
readings to detect events. Biswal et al., [13] use the strongest
signatures of event in PMU data for situational awareness
enhancement. In our previous work [14] we describe an
architecture for a cyber-physical distribution grid, and show
how event detection using µPMU measurements can help in
reasoning about the security status of the grid. A study by
Brahma et al., [15] describes the real-time dynamic event
identification in power system using PMU data based on a
data-driven and also physics-based method.
B. Our Contribution
Our approach for event detection is a combination of
the data-driven methods, as well as criteria resulting from
analyzing the underlying physical model of the system. We
first define a hierarchical “anomaly detection architecture”
to host a set of anomaly detection rules that are proposed
for the analysis and fusion of µPMU sensor measurements.
Unlike model agnostic machine learning methods that look for
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2statistical anomalies in a feature space that is often heuristic,
the anomalies that algorithms in this paper identify are defined
in the context of power quality and protection, in addition
to what is imposed by the grid governing physical equations
(i.e. Kirchhoff Voltage and Current Laws). This, in turn,
gives a DSO much greater insight and help in the forensic
analysis. Because of the important role played by µPMU
data in the framework, a source-constrained µPMU placement
optimization is described, to achieve the maximum sensitivity
in detecting a change1.
C. Notation
The following notations are used throughout the paper:
j Imaginary unit.
IN N ×N identity matrix.
AT ,A∗, Transpose, conjugate,
AH and conjugate transpose of matrix A.
||A||, ||A||F 2-norm and F-norm of matrix A.
1m×n m× n size matrix with entries 1.
A† Pseudo-inverse of matrix A.
⊗ Kronecker product.
II. ANOMALY DETECTION ARCHITECTURE
As shown in Fig. 1 the first stage of the “anomaly detection
architecture” hierarchy is next to each µPMU sensor in the
field and the second stage is at a central node that can be
hosted in the Distribution System Operator (DSO) control
room. The algorithms for anomaly detection applied next to
each µPMU sensor are referred to as “local rules” and those
that aggregate readings of multiple µPMUs as “central rules”.
For large grid sizes, the aggregation can occur in multiple
Central Engine
Local Engines
PMUs
Control Center
Fig. 1. Anomaly Detection Architecture Using µPMU Measurements.
steps, where mid-level stages analyze part of the data and
forward them upward.
This design has the following benefits: (1) it is robust due
to its distributed, redundant nature; (2) it can be inexpensively
deployed at existing utilities; (3) it analyzes the data close to
real-time; as opposed to the common practicing of post hoc
auditing of logged data; (4) the employed µPMUs are placed
in separate protection domains—including a separate com-
munications network—from the DSCADA systems, so that
1Note that PMU placement methods studies for state estimation are not
applicable here since the state is not directly observable by solely depending
on the µPMUs due to the scarcity of sensors.
attacks against the DSCADA network will not compromise
the operation of the architecture. In addition, µPMUs can
be seamlessly added to the network via wireless modems.
Further addressing security, the µPMUs are not only de-
signed to be read-only via the network, but are both placed
behind networked “bastion hosts” and can communicate bi-
directionally via encrypted protocols, thereby fortifying the
devices against tampering without physical access; (5) finally,
even if a data injection attack can be launched against some
µPMUs, depending on level that is compromised (from field
devices up to the control center), some µPMUs and some of
our rules may still be effective, due to the fact that every device
in a certain level processes information independently. Thus,
in our threat model, it is assumed that our detection rules are
less-vulnerable to data injection attacks than attacks against
typical DSCADA networks.
The suite of algorithms that are proposed for the anomaly
detection architecture layers have the following advantages in
comparison to the present state of the art: (1) due to the near-
real-time analysis, analytic results can be used to prioritize the
traffic flow from the lower to higher layer, pushing forward
reports of anomalies faster than data that do not raise a flag
and need to simply be accrued for historical purposes; (2) it
employs three-phase distribution grid equations rather than the
more commonly-used positive sequence solution, thus avoid-
ing the errors arising due to poor modeling; (3) a quasi steady-
state condition is considered as the normal regime of operation
rather than the idealistic steady-state which assumes there is
no frequency drift. These modeling aspects are clarified in our
discussion next.
III. THE µPMU DATA IN A DISTRIBUTION GRID
Fig. 2 shows the pi model of a distribution line that connects
bus m to n. Assuming normal conditions, the µPMUs are
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Fig. 2. pi Model of a Distribution Line
designed to capture samples of the three phase voltage phasor,
which is denoted by v[k] ∈ C3×1, and of the current phasor
i[k] ∈ C3×1 in specific sites of a distribution grid. Next we
apply Kirchhoff’s and Ohm’s law for a three-phase line in a
quasi steady-state condition.
A well-known fact from signals and systems theory is that
the relationship between voltage and current through a passive
circuit with a certain admittance matrix can be represented as
a multiplication in the frequency domain and as a convolution
in the time domain. Because the circuit is three phase, these
will be represented by a Multi-Input Multi-Output system. This
3fact also holds for the phasor of the signals. We first define
ymn(t) and y
sh
mn(t) to denote the time domain equivalents of
the matrices Y mn(f + f0) and Y shmn(f + f0), respectively. In
discrete time, the convolution relationship is as follows:
imn[k] =
N−1∑
r=0
ymn[r]vm[k − r]− ymn[r]vn[k − r] (1)
where ymn[r] = ymn[r] + y
sh
mn[r] and it is assumed that
yshij [n] and ymn[r] are the samples respectively of y
sh
mn(t) ?
h(t) and ymn(t)?h(t), have finite support N and are causal
2.
Next, the form of this relationship during the quasi steady-
state is shown, since the steady-state in reality never happens,
which in turn represents the governing equations during a
regime of operation that is referred to as “normal”.
The fundamental frequency of the voltage and current
signals are always varying, even in a normal state (al-
though slowly and over a very small range), because of
load-generation imbalances, active power demand interactions,
large generators inertia, and the automatic speed controllers
of the generators [16]. The effect observable is a change of
grid operation regime from steady-state to quasi steady-state.
The off-nominal frequency therefore affects the phase angle
captured by phasor measurement devices. To highlight that
mathematically, the phasor readings are decomposed vm[k]
and imn[k] as follows:
vm[k] = vˆm[k]e
jβm[k]k, imn[k] = iˆmn[k]e
jβm[k]k (2)
where vˆm[k] is the voltage phasor that is observed at nominal
frequency, while iˆmn[k] is the current phasor after removing
the exponential term due to the off-nominal frequency at
bus m, βm[k], that represents the (time-varying) drift in the
frequency induced by the above-mentioned reasons.
Considering the Discrete Time Fourier Transform, we have:
Y mn(f + f0)H(f) = rect(Tsf)Ts
N−1∑
r=0
ymn[r]e
−j2pirTsf
(3)
where 1Ts = 120Hz is the µPMU output rate, and H(f) is the
frequency response of the filter h(t). Introducing:
Y mn(f0, k) ,
1
Ts
Y mn
(
f0 +
βn[k]
2piTs
)
H
(
βn[k]
2piTs
)
, (4)
we have that
Y mn(f0, k) =
N−1∑
r=0
yij [r]e
−jβn[k]r, (5)
and similarly Y mn(f0, k) =
∑N−1
r=0 ymn[r]e
−jβm[k]r.
During the quasi steady-state the variations in vˆm[k] and
βm[k] are negligible over a window of N samples, which
2h(t) denotes the low-pass filter implemented in the µPMU to extract the
baseband signal and H(f) is its corresponding frequency response. It should
be noted that the outputs of µPMU, and their corresponding functions, are not
the exact phasors if the bandwidth of the signal (voltage/current) is greater
than 2f0, and are aliased. However, what we are interested in is to track any
data abnormality (instead of the exact grid state during the event). Therefore,
as long as it is not suppressing the anomaly, having aliasing is not an issue
for our rules.
means vˆm[k − r] ≈ vˆm[k] and βm[k − r] ≈ βm[k]. Using
this approximation, (1) can be re-written as:
imn[k] ≈
N−1∑
r=0
ymn[r]vˆm[k]e
jβm[k](k−r)
− ymn[r]vˆn[k]ejβn[k](k−r)
= Y mn(f0, k)vm[k]− Y mn(f0, k)vn[k]
(6)
Equation (6) is Ohm’s law in the phasor domain and is the
cornerstone for our transients detection algorithm derived in
the following section. The analysis above explains through (6)
why in the phasor domain, the equivalent effect of the quasi-
steady state conditions is that the admittances (4) fluctuate.
The effect is usually modest, because β[k] is small. However,
during a severe transient or frequency in the order of 10Hz the
relationship (6) with the matrices in (4) does not hold, due to
the manifestation of the full dynamic behavior in (1).
In the following, the “local” and “central” rules are defined
leveraging these insights and the knowledge about power
system operation. Note that our rules are set up in a way
that all the local engines are agnostic about Y mn(f0, k)
and Y mn(f0, k), and the sensor siting. However, it is as-
sumed that the central engine knows Y shmn(f0, k)|β[k]=0 and
Y mn(f0, k)|β[k]=0 for the lines within its monitoring region
and the difference from (4) is treated as equivalent to noise
in the observation model. Therefore, when dealing with cen-
tral rules, we will simply use Y shmn and Y mn to refer to
Y shmn(f0, k)|β[k]=0 and Y mn(f0, k)|β[k]=0.
IV. DATA ANALYSIS
Our rules monitor for abnormalities in the following quanti-
ties 1) voltage magnitude, 2) instantaneous frequency drift, 3)
current magnitude, 4) active power, 5) reactive power, and 6)
the validity of quasi steady-state equations. The “local rules”
just require the stream of phasors from a single µPMU, while
the “central rules” combine multiple streams across µPMUs.
A. Local Rules
The “local rules” are applied at the lowest layer of the
“anomaly detection architecture”, and run on systems on or
immediately adjacent to the µPMUs. Their common feature
is that they require no specific prior knowledge of the grid
network parameters.
TABLE I
VOLTAGE MAGNITUDE ANOMALIES
anomaly signature 3
voltage sag 0.1 ≤ |v| ≤ 0.9, T0/2 ≤ τ ≤ 60s
voltage swell 1.1 ≤ |v| ≤ 1.8, T0/2 ≤ τ ≤ 60s
interruption |v| < 0.1, T0/2 ≤ τ ≤ 60s
sustained interruption |v| < 0.1, τ > 60s
undervoltage 0.1 ≤ |v| ≤ 0.9, τ > 60s
overvoltage 1.1 ≤ |v| ≤ 1.8, τ > 60s
3The voltage magnitude is in p.u.
41) Voltage Magnitude Changes: The magnitude of the volt-
age varies within a small range that power quality standards
enforce during the normal operations [17]. Therefore, any large
deviation from that range indicates an abnormal condition.
Table. I lists the anomalies that can be observed in the voltage
magnitude labeled by their severity and duration, denoted by
|v| and τ , respectively.
2) Current Magnitude, Active, and Reactive Power
Changes: Suitable quantities to monitor for changes that can
be computed locally from the µPMU voltage and current
phasor measurements vm[k] and imn[k] are current magnitude,
active and reactive powers. The three phase apparent power
can simply be computed as:
Smn[k] = Pmn[k] + jQmn[k] = diag(vm[k])i∗mn[k] (7)
where Pmn[k] and Qmn[k] are the three-phase active and
reactive powers, respectively. Note that for the sake of tracking
a power flow change in the distribution grid, tracking the
active power and reactive power is preferable over monitoring
the phase angle difference, since the resistance of the lines
is not negligible, and therefore the angle difference does
not necessarily indicate the direction of the power flow. We
observed this fact in our partner utility grid, when the voltage
phase angle at one end of the line was less than the angle at
the other end, though the direction of the power flow was not
from the higher angle to the lower one.
Even when the voltage magnitude is within the safe range
discussed previously, changes in active and reactive power can
still happen due to the change of the load, affecting current
magnitude and the phase angle between current and voltage
phasors. Therefore, it is also of interest to track fast-changes of
these quantities using the method described in Section. IV-C.
Because physical changes in this class of data on the
distribution grid can be potentially indicative of negative be-
havior, it is important to determine the direction (upward trend,
downward trend or oscillation) of the change. The anomalies
related to fast changes are labeled in this class of data with
surge, drop, and oscillation for increasing, decreasing, and
swinging trends respectively by estimating the slope of the
signal around the time of change.
While we have primarily introduced fast state changing
events in both the dynamic and transient realms, we must also
consider events in the steady state time frame, slower changing
yet also potentially critical. An example of this could include
a line rating or transformer load being slowly but consistently
exceeded leading to accelerated failure. During the quasi
steady-state, the three phase current phasor magnitude flowing
in each line, i.e., |imn[k]|, should be less than or equal the line
rated current, |imn|max. This constraint is imposed as feeder
limit, and the violation is flagged as overcurrent.
3) Instantaneous Frequency Changes: For a µPMU at bus
m, we propose to estimate adaptively the instantaneous local
frequency deviation from the nominal frequency during the
quasi-steady state, using the approach for instance in [18] that
is tailored to three-phase distribution lines, to isolate abnormal
changes in the estimated frequency.
4) Quasi Steady-State Regime Validity: As previously
noted, when the grid is not in the normal quasi steady-state
conditions, the relationship between voltage and the current
phasors represents its full dynamic behavior, i.e. the grid is no
longer well-approximated by the set of memory-less algebraic
equations. Therefore, it is proposed to check the validity of
the quasi steady-state regime to flag the presence of transients
in the grid. At the local engines, (6) provides the basis for our
rule.
For the line in Fig. 2, assuming that a µPMU is installed at
bus m means that imn[k], and vm[k] are both available. Let
α[k] be the diagonal matrix such that voltage phasors of bus
m and bus n, connected via a power line, are related through:
vn[k] = α[k]vm[k], (8)
Defining:
R
(mn)
iv [k] =
1
M − 1
M−1∑
r=0
imn[k − r]vHm[k − r], (9)
R(nm)vv [k] =
1
M − 1
M−1∑
r=0
vn[k − r]vHm[k − r], (10)
Assuming that α[k] remains constant over a window of M
samples in the quasi-steady state, one can write:
R(nm)vv [k] ≈ α[k]R(mm)vv [k] (11)
It can be assumed that the variation of Y mn(f0, k) is neg-
ligible over M samples in normal operation and use (6) to
write:( I3 −Y mn(f0, k) + Y mn(f0, k)α[k] )
(
R
(mn)
iv [k]
R(mm)vv [k]
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
R
(mn)
k
≈ 0
Proposition 1. Correlation matrix R(mn)k is approximately
rank-1 during the quasi steady-state.
Proof. During the quasi-steady state along a distribution line,
the following assumptions hold with a very good approxima-
tion for r = 0, 1, ...,M − 1:
vˆm[k − r] ≈ vˆm[k], βm[k − r] ≈ βm[k] (12)
Therefore, we can write:
R(mm)vv [k] =
1
M − 1(vm[k]⊗Em[k])(v
H
m[k]⊗EHm[k])
=
1
M − 1(vm[k]v
H
m[k])⊗ (Em[k]EHm[k])
(13)
where Em[k] is defined as follows and represents the variations
due to the off-nominal frequency:
Em[k] = 13×1 ⊗
(
e−jβm[k](M−1) . . . e−jβm[k] 1
)
(14)
which we can then write:
Em[k]E
H
m[k] = (13×111×3)⊗ (M) =M13×3 (15)
and therefore:
R(mm)vv [k] =
M
M − 1(vm[k]v
H
m[k])⊗ (13×3) (16)
5which accordingly means that:
rank(R(mm)vv [k]) = rank(vm[k]v
H
m[k])× rank(13×3) = 1
Because:
rank(R
(mn)
k ) = rank((R
(mn)
k )
HR
(mn)
k )
we analyze the rank of (R(mn)k )
HR
(mn)
k here, where:
(R
(mn)
k )
HR
(mn)
k =(R
(mn)
iv [k])
HR
(mn)
iv [k]+
(R(mm)vv [k])
HR(mm)vv [k]
(17)
From the structure of (12) during the quasi-steady state, we
have:
R
(mn)
iv [k] = Y˜mn(f0, k)R
(mm)
vv [k]
Y˜mn(f0, k) = Y mn(f0, k)− Y mn(f0, k)diag(α[k])
(18)
Substituting (18) in (17), we have:
(R
(mn)
k )
HR
(mn)
k = (R
(mm)
vv [k])
HYmn(f0, k)R(mm)vv [k]
(19)
where:
Ymn(f0, k) = Y˜Hmn(f0, k)Y˜mn(f0, k) + I
Since the linear transformation of R(mm)vv [k] does not increase
its rank and since it has already been shown that R(mm)vv [k] is
of rank-1 during the quasi-steady state, one can conclude that:
rank(R
(mn)
k ) = rank((R
(mn)
k )
HR
(mn)
k ) ≤
rank(R(mm)vv [k])→ rank(R(mn)k ) = 1
(20)
Hence:
R
(mn)
k ≈ σ(mn)1 [k]u(mn)1 [k](ν(mn)1 [k])H →
R
(mn)
k (R
(mn)
k )
H ≈ (σ(mn)1 [k])2u(mn)1 [k](u(mn)1 [k])H
(21)
where σ(mn)1 is the largest singular value of R
(mn)
k , and u
(mn)
1
and ν(mn)1 are the corresponding left and right singular vectors
to that, respectively. Deviation from this subspace structure
can indicate that the line is experiencing a transient. We can
automate the detection of anomaly using this criterion by
computing the following cost minimization and tracking the
fast changes in x[k] for each incidental line to a bus with
µPMU:
x[k] =min
u
||(I6 − uuH)R(mn)k (R(mn)k )H ||F
s.t. ||u|| = 1
(22)
In other words, x[k] measures the size of the residual that
R
(mn)
k has in the space orthogonal to the optimal u, which
should be zero in the quasi steady-state and non-zero oth-
erwise. Since it has already been shown that R(mn)k is of
rank-1 during the quasi steady-state, the left singular vector
corresponding to the largest singular value of R(mn)k is the
only quantity of interest to compute the metric, instead of
computing all the singular vectors. Therefore, also owing it to
the small size of the matrix, the method is not computationally
very expensive.
Start
Read  vm[k], imn[k]  
Count1=0, Count2=0
Flag=0
Calculate the metrics 
in local rules 1-4
Any violation
/fast change?
Flag=0
Yes
No
Yes
k=k+1Flag=1
No
No
 Start time     k
 Flag=1
Yes
Count1=Count1+1
Count1 > T1
Yes
No
 Label the anomaly,
 Send the start time, end time and 
anomaly label to central engine,
 Reset start time, end time,
 Flag=0, Count1=0, Count2=0
Count2=Count2+1
Count2 > T2
No
 End time     k
Yes
 End time     “Persistent”
k=k+1
Fig. 3. Local Engine Analysis Flowchart Next to µPMU at Bus m.
To conclude the local rules, a flowchart of the analysis
performed at the local engine next to µPMU at bus m is
presented in Fig. 3. At each instant of time, the phasor readings
are received by the local engine and the introduced metrics
above are calculated. The pre-processed data are then passed
to the local rules to check for any violation. A violation could
be trespassing pre-defined limits (e.g., the voltage magnitude
rule, or maximum current magnitude limit) or fast changes in a
metric with smooth behavior during the normal condition (e.g.,
quasi steady-state validity rule). Once a violation is found
in one of the metrics, the start time is recorded. The search
for anomaly continues until no new violation is found for a
certain window of time (“Count1 > T1”), and that specifies
the end time of the anomaly. The type of anomaly is then
determined based on the behavior of the data between the
start time and the end time (e.g., active power surge, voltage
interruption,...). The start time, end time and the anomaly
label is then sent upstream for further analysis/visualization,
and the parameters are reset for next event. If the number
of detected violations related to a certain event passes a pre-
defined threshold (“Count2 > T2”), the end time is replaced
with a “Persistent” label, and the results are sent to the central
engine, without waiting for the end of the event to arrive.
The reason is to be able to inform the operator about the
anomaly in time, and not waiting too long before something
more damaging happens.
B. Central Rule
At higher levels of aggregation, the central engine in our
case, the natural way to relate the measurements is through
the grid interconnection. For a grid with B buses, let I[k]
6denote the vector of three-phase current injection phasors with
size 3B, and V[k] represent the vector of three-phase voltage
phasor at all the buses, which contains 3B elements. We define
the measurement vector d[k] = (IT [k],VT [k])T . During the
steady-state, the following algebraic equation should hold:
Hd[k] = 0, H =
( I3B −Y 3(B×B) ) (23)
where Y is the admittance matrix of the grid that connects
the current injection to the bus voltages. During the quasi
steady-state these equations are close to be homogeneous.
Since the distribution grid is unbalanced, and the lines are
not transposed the set of equations that should be dealt with
are three phase instead of working with positive sequence [19].
In this framework, we are also able to include the laterals in
the admittance matrix by putting the entries corresponding to
the phases that do not exist equal to zero.
It is assumed that H is known, K denotes the number of
µPMUs that are available and that each device has enough
channels to measure the voltage and all incidental current
measurements of the bus on which it is placed. Therefore,
having a µPMU at bus m means that the entries in V[k]
corresponding to vm[k] and entries in I[k] corresponding to∑
n:m∼n imn[k] are both available, where m ∼ n denotes that
bus m and n are connected through a line. Let T denote a
matrix parsing the vector d[k] into two parts corresponding
to the unavailable measurements, du[k], and the available
measurements, da[k]:
T =
(
Tu
Ta
)
→ Td =
(
du
da
)
, HTT =
(
Hu Ha
)
(24)
where K ′ = B −K and
Tu ∈ {0, 1}6(K′×B), Ta ∈ {0, 1}6(K×B) (25)
Tu and Ta here are block diagonal matrices of size 6(K ′×B)
and 6(K × B) with entries equal to 0 or 1. The former is
supposed to select the unavailable current and voltage phasors
by having entries equal to 1 at corresponding locations, and the
latter is supposed to pick the available phasors. Since TTT =
I, we can rewrite (23) as follows:
Hudu[k] + Hada[k] = 0→ (26a)
Hada[k] = −Hudu[k]. (26b)
Let first assume that we have enough µPMUs that satisfy K >
B
2 . Therefore, the matrix Hu would be a tall matrix and has
a left null-space. Premultiplying both sides of (26b) by the
projector on the left null-space of Hu, we have:
(I −HuH†u)Hada[k] = 0 (27)
because (I − HuH†u)Hu=0. The equality in (26b) only
holds during the steady-state (and for quasi steady-state with
a good approximation), which means that equation (27) is
homogeneous only in the steady-state (nearly-homogeneous
in the quasi steady-state), and non-homogeneous otherwise.
The following metric should, therefore, be close to zero only
during normal operation and if H is unchanged:
x[k] =
||(I −HuH†u)Hada[k]||22
||da[k]||22
(28)
However, in reality, the number of available µPMUs, K  B2 .
In this case, Hu is a fat matrix and, in general, is of full
row rank, which in turn means that (I −HuH†u)=0, and our
criterion becomes trivial. However, HuHHu has generally a
high condition number, due to the weak grid connectivity.
Therefore, both sides of (26b) can be projected on the sub-
space spanned by the left singular vector, denoted by uu,s
corresponding to the smallest singular value of Hu expecting
that uHu,sHudu[k] to be small. Accordingly, when the quasi
steady-state is the regime of operation, i.e., when the equality
in (26b) holds, it is expected that the following function to be
small and to vary smoothly:
x[k] =
|uHu,sHada[k]|2
||da[k]||2 . (29)
The exit from this behavior is then marked as an anomaly in
the central engine and x[k] is the quantity that is proposed to
be tracked for fast changes for this purpose.
The flowchart for the central engine is similar to the one for
local engine to some extent except that all the µPMU readings
are required to form the central metric, and the results from
the local analysis are received by the central engine, and the
analysis results from this stage are not shipped anywhere, and
are ready to be displayed for the operator.
C. Fast Change Detection Method
As explained above, some of the criteria defined in local and
central rules require tracking fast changes in the quantities that
are defined, because severe variations in x[k] are signatures of
an anomaly. From real data and simulations we have verified
that variations in the mean value for these quantities during the
quasi steady-state regime are extremely smooth. This observa-
tion prompted us to consider changes in their mean value as
the common statistical trade-mark of anomalies in all of these
quantities and to use the sequential two-sided Cumulative Sum
(CUSUM) algorithm [20], [21] as a heuristic. The use of this
algorithm amounts to approximating the samples, for all the
aforementioned quantities, as outcomes of a Gaussian non-
zero mean process with independent observations. Although
the observations are in fact temporally correlated, our objective
(i.e. fast change detection in mean) justifies the relaxation that
the random process has independent observation samples. The
algorithm decides between two hypotheses H0: no change in
the mean, or H1: change in the mean, at time k.
We expect to see multiple change points during an event.
Detection of multiple change points is achieved by resetting
the decision functions and cumulative sums to zero after the
change is detected, and continuing the inspection of upcoming
samples. The fast change anomaly is completed if no new
changes are detected for a defined window of time.
V. OPTIMAL µPMU PLACEMENT
In tandem with the anomaly detection, the criterion that was
described for the central engine can be the basis to determine
an optimal placement for the µPMUs. As it was mentioned, the
challenge here is that we cannot feasibly nor practically deploy
7µPMUs at all nodes in the distribution system, therefore we
consider a limited deployment, where K  B2 .
Ideally, we want the matrix Hu to have a left null-space, i.e.,
the criterion in (29) to be zero in the steady-sate. Considering
the high condition number of HuH†u, a reasonable approach
to find the optimal configuration is to minimize the norm in
(29) over all the possible placement configurations. Let first
rewrite the defined metric in (29):
x[k] =
dHa [k]H
H
a uu,su
H
u,sHada[k]
||da||2 . (30)
We desire our formulation to be only topology-dependent.
Therefore, the optimal placement problem is formulated as
a min-max optimization with the following structure:
Πopt = argmin
Π
λmax(W)
s.t.
(
Hu Ha
)
= H
(
TTu T
T
a
)
T = I2 ⊗ (Π⊗ I3),
W = HHa uu,su
H
u,sHa, [Π]i,j ∈ {0, 1}∑
j
[Π]i,j = 1,
∑
i
[Π]i,j = 1
(31)
Since λmax(W) = maxda[k]
dHa [k]Wda[k]
||da[k]||2 , essentially we are
choosing a placement that minimizes the maximum value that
our objective function can take over possible set of available
measurement vectors da[k].
An exhaustive search is required to find the global optimum
of the optimization problem in (31), which is exponentially
complex, and therefore does not scale well. This becomes a
barrier when the size of the grid is large, i.e., in most of the real
grids. Therefore, we propose to employ a “Greedy Search”
as an alternative to reduce the time complexity to polylog,
while accepting to be near-optimal. The pseudo-code of the
employed greedy search is illustrated in Algorithm. 1.
Algorithm 1: Greedy Search Pseudo-Code for Optimal
µPMU Placement.
Initialization
K := Number of µPMUs;
P := ∅, // Set of selected placement locations;
L := Set of candidate placement buses;
begin
for n=1..K do
Cost← inf;
for each l ∈ L do
P := P ∪ {l};
given P, calculate λmax(W);
if λmax(W) < Cost then
lopt ← l;
Cost← λmax(W);
P := P \ {l};
P := P ∪ {lopt};
L := L \ {lopt};
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we first find the optimal placement for our
µPMUs based on (31) and then test the effectiveness of the
proposed anomaly detection criteria through simulated data
and real data, provided from the µPMUs that are installed in
our partner utility medium voltage (12.47 kV) grid.
A. Synthetic Data
The IEEE-34 bus test case [22] is simulated using the time-
domain simulation environment of DIgSILENT [23] that deals
with differential equations rather than memory-less equations.
The sampling rate is selected to be equal to the sampling rate
of the Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC) in a real µPMU,
which is 512 × 60 Hz =30720 samples per sec.. We then pro-
cessed these time-domain data through our phasor estimation
algorithm, that emulates a two-cycle, P-class algorithm based
on the IEEE C37.118.1 [24] producing phasor samples at a rate
of 120 Hz. The single-line diagram of the test case is shown
in Fig. 4. This case includes single-phase laterals, voltage
regulators, and untransposed lines, which all are modeled
exactly in our admittance matrix.
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Fig. 4. IEEE 34-Bus Test Feeder Single-Line Diagram
Table. II compares the objective value for a random place-
ment, “Greedy Search” and “Exhaustive Search”, and the time
complexity of each solver, assuming that K = 3 µPMUs are
available. The objective value of the “Greedy Search” and
TABLE II
IEEE-34 CASE OPTIMAL µPMU PLACEMENT RESULT FOR K = 3
Random Greedy Exhaustive
Optimum Cost 1.7085 0.51477 0.51477
Buses with µPMUs {1,3,9} {7,19,31} {9,19,31}
Run Time – 2.84 s 290.266 s
the “Exhaustive Search”, and the set of the selected buses are
close to each other, while the run time of the “Greedy Search”
is 102.206 times faster. Hence, the “Greedy Search” can be a
very good choice to solve our optimal placement problem.
As expected, the placement rule tries to scatter the available
µPMUs all over the grid, in order to achieve the maximum
possible coverage.
In order to investigate how the time complexity grows, and
also analyze the results of the placement criterion, the 123
standard test case in [22] was used, considering 20 µPMUs
available (i.e., K = 20). Without loss of generality, the 123
test feeder was reduced to 70 buses to only include three-phase
8lines, and roll up all the laterals (single-phase and two-phase
lines). The reasoning behind this reduction is that visibility on
the main feeder is more important for us than the the visibility
on the laterals, considering the limited number of µPMUs.
Using a machine with 60 Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E7-4870 v2
@ 2.30GHz cores, it took 11.56 Sec for the algorithm to place
20 µPMUs over 70 buses. Fig. 5 illustrates the location of
the optimally-placed µPMUs in the reduced grid. It can be
observed from the figure that the µPMUs are scattered over
the grid to achieve the maximum sensitivity with respect to
different locations of anomalies.
Fig. 5. Optimally-Placed µPMUs on Reduced IEEE 123 Test Feeder.
1) Single-Line to Ground Fault-IEEE 34 Bus: In this simu-
lation, the rules are tested for detecting anomaly with respect
to a Single-Line to Ground Fault (SLGF), which is a very
common type of short-circuit fault in the distribution grid. A
SLGF was introduced on “Phase a” of line (25,26), which then
caused the fuse placed on the phase a of this line near bus 25
to melt down. Our three µPMUs are placed on buses, 7, 19,
and 31 based on the “greedy search” result for the optimal
placement criterion.
The results of the “voltage magnitude change” rule is
shown in Fig. 6 for µPMUs 7, and 19 for instance. Simply,
the rule inspects the data for large deviations, label them
accordingly, and find the start time and the end time of the
event, marked with blue and red stars.
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Fig. 6. Voltage Magnitude Local Rule Result for SLGF.
Fig. 7 illustrates the metric value in (29) for the specified
lines that is inspected with M = 12 to check whether the
grid is in the quasi steady-state or not, where the voltage and
current data are first converted to per-unit system assuming
Sb = 1 MVA. The start time of the detected changes are also
marked, setting the CUSUM detector parameters fixed in all
the three local engines corresponding to each µPMU. As it can
be observed, there are two periods in which the grid manifests
its dynamic: the first one corresponds to the occurrence of
the fault and the second matches with the fuse meltdown.
In addition, based on the severity of the transient that each
µPMU measures, the number of detected changes via CUSUM
varies. In this case, considering the location of the µPMUs
and the location and type of the fault, the most severe change
appears in the metric corresponding to measurements from
line (19,20), while the changes in metric for line (31,32) is
very small. Therefore, based on the defined parameters on the
detector, CUSUM finds quite a large number of change points
in the former, while it is not set to be sensitive to the changes
in the order that appears in the latter. In fact, if the detector
is set to be too sensitive, it can increase “false alarms” in
the system. Also note that due to the two-cycle calculation of
the phasor, and use of M samples to calculate the correlation
matrix, the event appears and disappears with a systematic
delay. The other local rules also capture the anomaly, though
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Fig. 7. Quasi Steady-State Validity Checking for SLGF.
with different severity and behavior (we just show some of
the results here for lack of space). In fact, many of the local
rules may detect the same event, though some rules are more
informative than others depending on the cause. Each triggered
rule reports a start and an end time for the event. Storing these
time-tags for eventful segments of data helps understanding
their relationship.
The metric defined for our central engine is also illustrated
in Fig. 8. The delay in appearing and disappearing of the event
in here is solely due to the two-cycle phasor calculation.
It should be noted that the value of the metric in (29) during
the quasi steady-state is highly dependent on the number of
µPMUs and the topology of the grid that together determine
the structure of Hu and Ha. However, the best placement of
the µPMUs for a certain topology and number of µPMUs that
makes the metric to be as close as possible to zero, returns
a certain objective value that can be used as the baseline to
determine what is a normal value for x[k] and what would be
an anomaly.
2) Discussion–Compromised Data: We illustrate here the
resilience of the architecture to data injection attacks. For this
purpose, three data attack scenarios are investigated happening
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Fig. 8. Central Rule Inspection for SLGF.
concurrently with the SLGF event discussed previously. We
consider the case of the attacker manipulating the data of
µPMU 7 in the first case, and µPMU 19 in the second case,
and finally µPMU 7 and 19 at the same time in the third case
on their way to the central engine. In all cases the data injected
are a replay of the last available data set before the anomaly
starts. Setting the change detector parameters fixed for all the
three cases, Fig. 9 shows, for each case, the central rule and the
start time of the detected changes. As can be seen, since µPMU
19 is playing an important role for this event, having µPMU
7 compromised will not affect our central rule significantly
(case-1). However, when the µPMU 19 is compromised, the
number of detected changes reduce significantly (case-2), and
when both µPMU 7 and 19 are compromised and the only
healthy data is coming from µPMU 31, the detector does not
pick any fast changes based on the set parameters. This also
reveals the importance of tuning the detector thresholds to
have a certain “false alarm,” while maximizing the “detection”
probability. We wish to remark that in all the three cases, the
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Fig. 9. Central Rule for SLGF with Manipulated µPMU Data.
local analytics that directly draw data from µPMUs will still
flag the alarm, so buffering locally at the site of the event
these data can be an important way of helping understand what
communications were compromised in an ex-post analysis.
3) Discussion–Optimal vs Non-Optimal Placement: As it
was mentioned, the placement criterion tries to scatter the
available µPMUs over the grid to achieve the maximum
coverage, and therefore make the central rule more sensitive
to anomalies.
In order to compare the performance of an optimal versus
non-optimal placement, a load loss event is created on bus 24
of IEEE-34 test case at t = 0.4s. The µPMUs are placed
based on the random placement and greedy search result
given in Table. II, corresponding to non-optimal and optimal
placement, accordingly. Fig. 10 shows the central metric for
these two cases. Since the relative change is what matters to
our detector, the metrics corresponding to two placement are
brought on the same scale. As it can be observed, since the
µPMUs in the random placement are concentrated at a certain
area, events like this would not be very pronounceable in the
central metric, which could possibly lead to a “false-negative”.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Time (sec)
1.375
1.38
1.385
1.39
1.395
1.4
1.405
x
Central Metric
Greedy Search Placement
Random Placement
Fig. 10. Central Metric Change of a Load Loss Event; Optimal versus Non-
optimal Placement.
B. Real Data
Fig. 11 shows the abstract one-line diagram of the partner
utility grid and the location of the installed µPMUs. The
installed µPMUs sample the voltage and current with a rate of
512×60 Hz, and output the estimated phasors at 120 Hz rate.
These devices achieve an accuracy of 0.001 deg resolution for
phasor angle, 0.0002% for phasor magnitude, and 0.01% for
Total Vector of Error (TVE) [25]. The two feeders here are
connected through the subtransmission grid.
Subtransmission 
Grid
Feeder 1
Feeder 2
PV Site
µPMU 1 
µPMU 2 
µPMU 3 
Fig. 11. Location of Installed µPMUs in Our Partner Utility Grid.
Fig. 12 shows the voltage magnitude change rule inspected
on the data from these µPMUs over a certain time. The results
of the fast change inspection on the current magnitude of
phase a and instantaneous local frequency at the substation
bus of feeder 2 are also illustrated in Fig. 13(a) and Fig. 13(b),
respectively. Observing the results of analysis, the DSO can
deduce that the cause of the event is most probably located
on feeder 2. Also, from the pre- and post-anomaly value of
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Fig. 12. Voltage Magnitude Change Rule for Real Data.
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Fig. 13. Fast Change Tracking of Current Phasor Magnitude and Bus
Instantaneous Frequency Drift for Real Data.
the current magnitude, the DSO can conclude that some of the
loads on this feeder tripped due to the voltage sag. We just
showed the results from some of the rules due to the space
limit but other rules can also flag the existence of anomaly on
feeder 2.
All the metrics introduced and tested above are designed
considering the specifications of a distribution grid. It should
be noted that not all the proposed methods in the literature for
transmission grid are applicable in the distribution side. For
example, the phase angle difference in the distribution grid is
known to be much smaller than that in the transmission level.
Therefore, as opposed to transmission grid that this metric
would work well for event detection [12], it might not be a
proper metric to look at in the distribution grid, since the signal
to noise ratio might be small. The example next illustrates
how the voltage angle difference metric could have failed if it
was used as a “local rule”. Using the data from two µPMUs
installed at two ends of a line at a second utility grid (not
the one in Fig. 11), the voltage magnitude captured by the
µPMU at one end of the line is shown in Fig. 14(a) and the
voltage phasor angle difference between the two µPMUs at
two ends of the line is shown in Fig. 14(b). As it can be
observed, the important event in this period corresponds to
the two voltage sags. However, the angle difference shows
a significant number of spikes without clearly marking these
two events with the same significance. Passing this metric to
our detector, we would pick too many fast changes that do not
represent any specific event of interest, which therefore means
an increase in the number of “false positives”. All streams of
interest were examined during this period, including both the
active and reactive power, and all anomalies detected were in
agreement with those visible in Fig. 14(a)
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Fig. 14. Voltage Phasor Angle Difference Between Two µPMUs at Distribu-
tion Grid.
1) Case Study-Robustness Against Volatility: The increas-
ing presence of renewable resources, like wind and solar,
in the distribution grid may raise some concerns about the
robustness of the proposed rules to “false alarms” due to
their inherent volatility. However, our method is based on an
adaptive estimation of the data mean using an exponential
window and, as shown in the following numerical example,
this makes the algorithm capable to only pick the fast changes
over a very short period of time, while being insensitive
to changes in the time order of normal renewable resources
fluctuations. To show it numerically, we refer to two real events
captured by µPMU 2 in the grid in Fig.11. Fig. 15(a) shows
a dramatic change of about -18.25% over 9 seconds in the
PV site active power injection due to the cloud effects, and
Fig. 15(b) shows a step change in the active power after the PV
site went out of service. Setting the detection parameters to be
the same for both events, it can be seen that the detector flags
no event for the first case and finds multiple of fast changes
in the second. This is ideal since the events of our interest
in the this context are of the second type, which should be
discriminated from the normal quasi steady-state behavior in
the first case.
11:34:29 11:34:38
Time (PDT, 30-Oct-2016)
2
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
Ac
tiv
e 
Po
we
r I
nje
cti
on
 (M
W)
PMU 2
Phase a
15:04:04 15:04:12
Time (PDT, 31-Oct-2015)
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Ac
tiv
e 
Po
we
r I
nje
cti
on
 (M
W)
PMU 2
Phase a
Detected Changes
(a) (b)
No Detected Event!
Fig. 15. Fast Change Tracking of Injected Active Power in the PV Site.
Considering the existence of different types of loads in
the distribution grid, the detector should also be able to
differentiate between possible normal fluctuations in the load
profile and those that are caused by a rare event. To show the
11
performance of CUSUM for this case, real data of a µPMU
installed behind a building with a non-linear load is used. As
it can be seen in Fig. 16, the fast change tracker of the current
magnitude does not pick the fluctuations due to the non-linear
load behavior as an event and only flags a segment of data
that corresponds to a voltage sag in the grid as an eventful
segment.
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Fig. 16. Fast Change Tracking of Current Magnitude for a Non-Linear Load.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTION
In this paper, a hierarchical “anomaly detection architec-
ture” has been described that integrates high resolution, syn-
chronous µPMU data to attain high accuracy in the detection
of the physical effects of an event. A set of rules has been
formulated to process the µPMUs’ data at the local and central
level of our hierarchical architecture. Exiting from the quasi
steady-state regime is a common signature of many anomalies,
and this insight is exploited to design a key part of the
proposed metrics. To ensure scalability of our architecture,
the rules at the local stage are designed to be agnostic about
the grid interconnection and physical location of the sensor.
Depending on the type of event, the effects on different met-
rics has different severity and, therefore, inspecting different
metrics at the local level reduces the miss-detection rate. The
analysis in the higher stages is designed to bind the readings
from different µPMUs using the knowledge about the grid
topology and sensor locations in search for eventful segments.
Using real data and simulations, we have shown how pro-
cessing real-time physical measurements from µPMUs enables
us to detect effectively anomalies in the system and inform
the operator about the grid status. Having a limited number of
µPMUs, an optimal placement criterion is also designed with
respect to the central rule that aims to scatter µPMUs over the
grid to achieve maximum coverage and therefore to increase
the sensitivity of the rule to different event source locations.
Having an anomaly identified, our future efforts will focus
on identifying and localizing the source of the anomaly using
the underlying physical model when possible or, in general,
at least confine the search region to a smaller set of compo-
nents/lines. This include the identification of any change in
the admittance matrix, due to loss of a line, reconfiguration of
the grid, and etc.
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